This paper uses quarterly data for the United States, European Union, and three other industrialized economies to estimate the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988:Q1-2010:Q4. First, estimates on a pre-Great Recession sample provide evidence of three key relationships for the US and EU. Increases in domestic unemployment rates and real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates lead to substantial increases in antidumping and related forms of import protection. Furthermore, a previously overlooked result is that policy-imposing economies historically imposed such bilateral import restrictions on trading partners that were going through their own periods of weak economic growth. Second, we use estimates from the pre-Great Recession model to predict the trade policy response during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4, given the realized macroeconomic shocks. We find new US and EU trade barriers were projected to cover up to an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports, well above the 2-3 percent of import coverage in effect immediately preceding the crisis. Third, we re-estimate the model on data from the Great Recession period in order to examine why the realized trade policy response, which only covered an additional 1-2 percent points of US and EU imports, differed from model predictions based on historical data. While exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting import protection, the US and EU also "switched" from their historical behavior during the Great Recession and shifted new import protection toward those trading partners experiencing economic growth and away from those that were contracting.
Introduction
Since the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs during the early days of the Great Depression, a widespread presumption is that import tariffs and other forms of trade protection rise during periods of macroeconomic weakness. During the Great Recession, the fear of a widespread import restrictions led to pre-emptive statements like the G20 Declaration of November 2008 cited above. This paper uses quarterly data for the United States, European Union, and three other industrialized economies to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on import protection policies over 1988-2010. We investigate different periods of data and find that key features of business cycles, such as increases in domestic unemployment, as well as real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and changing macroeconomic conditions in important trading partners, result in substantial, countercyclical increases in import protection. Not only do such macroeconomic shocks matter, but our evidence suggests that the changing nature over time and across trading partners as to how these shocks are transformed into new trade barriers has important implications for understanding any countercyclical patterns to import protection taking place across the multilateral trading system.
In the wake of the Great Depression, countries established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1940s and created an institutional framework by which governments could more predictably, cooperatively, and transparently manage changes to their trade policies. In particular, at the same time that countries began to engage in multilateral negotiations to eventually reduce and bind their applied, non-discriminatory tariffs -rates that have been negotiated to what are now historically low levels -they wrote rules into the GATT that established exceptions that permit countries to temporarily opt-out and raise their trade barriers in the face of economic shocks.
Import restrictions such as antidumping, global safeguards, the China-specific safeguard, and
countervailing duties -what we refer to throughout jointly as temporary trade barriers (TTBs) -are the primary policy exceptions to the liberal trade rules embodied in the GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). These policies are relatively substitutable and are the means through which industrialized countries have most predominantly implemented new trade restrictions since the 1980s. Quantitatively, these restrictions are economically important for the United States and European Union; 2-3 percent of nonoil imports were subject to some temporary trade barrier by the end of 2007.
1 Thus, while 2008-10 did not lead to the same sort of import restrictions that took place under US Smoot-Hawley tariff and trading partners' response in the 1930s (Irwin 2011a,b) , national trade policies were not left unchanged during the Great Recession. To the contrary, Bown (2011a) provides evidence of substantial trade policy "churning" -economies used TTBs to impose and remove a large number of bilateral import restrictions during this period. In the United States, for example, the cumulative effect of this churning was roughly a 20 percent increase in the stock of imports subject to these trade barriers by the end of 2010 relative to the level immediately prior to the crisis.
A substantial theoretical literature, much of it summarized in Bagwell and Staiger (2002) , has evolved to explain the role of trade agreements and the use of such temporary trade policy exceptions in the multilateral trading system under the GATT and WTO. The theoretical literature on these trade policy exceptions encompasses both terms-of-trade models of trade policy Staiger, 1990, 2003) and segmented markets models of imperfect competition such as the seminal contribution of Brander and Krugman (1983) . Our paper provides empirical support for the common predictions from these two different classes of trade models regarding the use of temporary trade barriers in the face of adverse macroeconomic shocks. Nevertheless, as Bagwell and Staiger (2003) and others have established, while there is an empirical presumption that import protection rises during recessions, there is not a universally acknowledged theory articulating the channels through which the countercyclical relationship between new import restrictions and macroeconomic shocks arise. 2 Thus, one purpose of this paper is to provide, in as much detail as possible, evidence on the 3 explicit linkages between macroeconomic shocks and import protection. Such evidence is important for understanding the role of trade agreements, their provision of exceptions, and the potential limits to what trade agreements can accomplish with respect to cooperative trade policy.
In addition to investigating the theory linking macroeconomic shocks to changes in trade policy, our paper provides a special focus on the events of 2008-2010. 3 Given the severity of macroeconomic shocks during the Great Recession, an open research question is why was the trade policy response so mild relative to expectations? As a first empirical assessment of this question, we estimate the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on the import-restricting policies of five separate industrialized economies -the United States, European Union, South Korea, Australia and Canada. shocks changed during the crisis, relative to the earlier period.
"…a common argument is that tariffs are higher in recessions, because the political pressure from import-competing firms is then most pronounced. This explanation, however, is incomplete, since it ignores the political influence of other production sectors that might press for less protection in recessions…In light of these competing political influences, the common argument for countercyclical tariffs fails to be convincing, as it does not explain why the political pressures from import-competing sectors dominate in recessions but not in booms."
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We find evidence of a strong empirical relationship between macroeconomic fluctuations and US and EU import protection policies. Real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and increases in domestic unemployment lead to substantial increases in antidumping and related forms of import protection. Furthermore, policy-imposing economies historically used such bilateral import restrictions on trading partners that were going through their own periods of weak economic growth.
With the exception of Crowley (2011) , most previous research does not sufficiently exploit the trading partner variation to identify this latter relationship. Empirically this is important because in the modern WTO system, new import protection is typically imposed bilaterally, unlike more general tariff protection. 4 Furthermore, evidence that potentially WTO-consistent TTBs were used to protect importing economies from negative growth shocks in trading partners is broadly consistent with one prominent strand of the theory of trade agreements summarized by Bagwell and Staiger (2002) (Bown, 2011a) . We interpret the surge of new trade barriers predicted by the historical model as providing a rationale for the widespread fear of "protectionism" among policymakers that ultimately led to the coordinated, G20 declaration presented above.
Finally, while the US and EU did experience a surge in new trade barriers during the Great Recession, the surge turned out to have been much smaller than that predicted by the models estimated on the historical data. In our final exercise, we present estimates from a longer time series 5 of data through 2010:Q4 so as to identify potential changes in the responsiveness of import restrictions to macroeconomic fluctuations relative to the pre-crisis period. First, a number of these policy-imposing economies, including the US and EU, "switched" from their historical behavior and refrained from implementing new import restrictions against those trading partners that were contracting during the Great Recession. Instead, these economies applied these import restrictions against trading partners that were experiencing relatively stronger economic growth. This transmission channel may have been a particularly important force for dampening the overall incidence of import protection, in line with the G20 Declaration, given that so many trading partners were undergoing periods of macroeconomic contraction during the crisis. Our paper is most closely related to a literature that has focused on macroeconomic determinants of antidumping import protection estimated on data from the 1980s and 1990s (Feinberg 1989 , Knetter and Prusa 2003 , Crowley 2011 . 5 In addition to a first empirical analysis of the relationship between macroeconomic shocks and import protection during the Great Recession, our approach makes a number of advances, extensions and refinements to the previous literature. First, we take advantage of newly available and detailed data at the product-level from the World Bank's (Bown, 2011b) to construct more precise, bilateral measures of import protection at the quarterly frequency. Second, we examine not just antidumping policy, but
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we also consider use of other, relatively substitutable forms of import protection that have taken on particular importance in the first decade of the 2000s, such as global safeguards, China-specific safeguards, and countervailing duties. Third, we rely on higher frequency macroeconomic data than 5 Feinberg (1989) focused on the 1982-1987 period for the United States and found evidence that more antidumping cases were associated with dollar depreciations. Knetter and Prusa (2003) examine annual data for the US, Canada, Australia and the EU over 1980-98 and find strong evidence of a relationship between antidumping cases and local currency appreciations, over this longer time series of data. Feinberg (2005) further extends the Knetter and Prusa (2003) approach to examine why the responsiveness of import protection to exchange rate movements has changed over this sample. Irwin (2005) extends the analysis for the US back to 1947 (through 2002) and provides evidence that nominal appreciations of the dollar are associated with more antidumping case filings per year.
6 most previous research, and this allows us to better address the relationship between business cycles, exchange rates, and import restrictions as well as the timing of any linkages. Fourth, we focus our analysis at the bilateral level -i.e., between a policy-imposing economy and a particular trading partner -and this bilateral emphasis for macroeconomic channels such as shocks to bilateral real exchange rates or a particular partner's real GDP growth is important given the discriminatory (i.e., trading partner-specific) nature of these forms of import protection.
This paper also contributes to a growing literature on the role of trade policy during the Great
Recession. In addition to Bown (2011a) , which estimates the changing stock of imported products subject to temporary trade barriers, other research has catalogued tariff increases at the product-line level for large numbers of countries during the early period of the crisis. Kee, Neagu and Nicita as the GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, despite substantial research documenting the countercyclical nature of business cycles and import protection dating back to at least the Great Depression (Irwin, 2011a,b) , as noted in the Introduction, there is not one universal theory linking imposition of new import restrictions to macroeconomic shocks. The theoretical contributions of Bagwell and Staiger (2003) , Crowley (2010) and Knetter and Prusa (2003) are the theory that forms our basis for empirical examination.
The Bagwell and Staiger (2003) theory models dynamic, self-enforcing trade agreements that are characterized by trade policy that fluctuates in response to macroeconomic conditions. give rise to recessions, cooperation to maintain low tariffs is more difficult in periods in which the expected rate of future trade growth is low. Thus, unilateral tariff increases are less costly in welfare terms during recessions with persistently underperforming growth because it is precisely then that the cost of a trade war is relatively low. This basic intuition generates the key empirical prediction of the model: import restrictions increase during recessions.
The theory that import restrictions increase in response to macroeconomic weakness abroad is also found in Crowley (2010) , which builds from the seminal, reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) . This theory focuses on the international trade rules regarding antidumping 8 import restrictions, the kind of policies of particular emphasis to our empirical analysis. In a model of imperfect competition in which domestic and foreign firms have capacity constraints, the foreign firm increases its exports to the domestic market at a "dumped" price when the foreign country's own demand for the product falls. In this environment, it is welfare-improving for the importing country to impose import restrictions against the foreign country that is trying to export its way out of a recession. The cross-sectional empirical prediction of this model is that an importer will impose trade restrictions against those foreign trading partners that are experiencing negative demand shocks in their own markets. the domestic currency price of the foreign good. Thus, the foreign firm will simultaneously increase its sales in the domestic market (increasing the likelihood of injury to the domestic import-competing industry) and be less likely to be guilty of dumping. Because an exchange rate movement has opposite effects on the two criteria for dumping, the model gives ambiguous empirical predictions regarding the relationship between an exchange rate appreciation and new antidumping import restrictions.
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In summary, the literature on macroeconomic fluctuations suggests that temporary trade barriers increase when domestic macroeconomic conditions are weak (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003) and foreign domestic macroeconomic conditions are weak (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003; Crowley, 2010 ). An appreciation of the domestic currency relative to a trading partner's currency implies more import restrictions if a national authority's antidumping investigation places more weight on the criterion of injury to the domestic industry than it places on the criterion of dumping (Knetter and Prusa, 2003) . 9
Empirical model
This section presents an empirical model of the number of imported products becoming subject to new temporary trade barrier investigations. The model relates the number of products under an antidumping, global safeguard, China safeguard, or countervailing duty investigation in a given quarter to a lagged value of the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, the change in the domestic unemployment rate, and foreign real GDP growth.
The dependent variable is the number of products imported from country i against which temporary trade barrier investigations are initiated by an importing economy in a quarter, t.
Empirically, the dependent variable is a non-negative count which exhibits over-dispersion. That is, the variance of the number of investigations per time period exceeds the mean (see Table 1 ).
Formally, we model temporary trade barriers as generated by a negative binomial distribution. In this model, the number of imported products under temporary trade barrier investigations, y it , follows a Poisson process after conditioning on the explanatory variables, x it , and unobserved heterogeneity, u it >0. Specifically,
Thus, the distribution of counts of products subject to temporary trade barriers, y it , given x it follows a negative binomial with conditional mean and variance
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the relationship between the number of products subject to investigations by an importing economy (United States, European Union, South Korea, Australia, Canada) against country i in quarter t as a function of the second lag (quarter t-2) of the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, the change in the domestic unemployment rate, and foreign real GDP growth. The model for each importing country is identified off intertemporal variation in the domestic unemployment rate in addition to intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in bilateral real exchange rates and foreign trading partner GDP growth.
In interpreting the coefficient estimates from this model, we report incidence rate ratios (IRRs) for the explanatory variables. That is, we report the ratio of counts predicted by the model when the second lag of an explanatory variable of interest is one unit above its mean value (and all other variables are at their means) to the counts predicted when all variables are at their means. To better quantify the results of our model, we frequently present information on the percent change in the predicted counts of imported products becoming subject to new TTBs that our model generates in response to one standard deviation shocks to each of the explanatory variables of interest.
Data and variable construction
There are a number of innovations in our data and modeling approach relative to the previous literature (e.g., see Knetter and Prusa, 2003) . Our first innovations consider how to measure import protection. For one, we are able to construct a quarterly series of bilateral trade policy actions at the universally-defined, 6-digit Harmonized System (HS-06) product level. The data derives from extremely detailed trade policy information found in the World Bank's Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2011b) that dates back to the 1980s. Second, we include not only import protection under the antidumping policy, as has been the focus of the previous literature, but we also include what are arguably substitutable policies such as global safeguards, China-specific safeguards, and countervailing duties. This second point may be particularly relevant given that a number of highprofile recent episodes of import protection -including the 2001-3 global safeguard on steel products imposed by the US, EU, and a number of other countries, and the 2009 US China-specific safeguard on imports of tires -took place under these alternative temporary trade barrier policies and would not be captured by an analysis restricted to antidumping.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the count of HS-06 imported products on which the government has agreed to initiate a new temporary trade barrier investigation against trading partner i in quarter t and against which there is not already an existing TTB in place.
10 This count variable is carefully constructed for each policy-imposing country by trading partner and by quarter in a conservative way that does not allow for redundancy. 11 In robustness checks, we also construct this variable using the antidumping policy alone. Because the Harmonized System has been in place and utilized across countries only since 1988, the time series dimension of our data begins at the earliest in 1988:Q1.
A second innovation to our approach is to examine data at the quarterly frequency, a potentially important phenomenon given that macroeconomic shocks may cross calendar years. The key macroeconomic determinants of import protection in our model are bilateral real exchange rates, domestic unemployment rates, and the foreign trading partner's real GDP growth, with each of the variables reflecting year-over-year changes at the quarterly frequency. 12 We define the exchange rate variable for each partner as the percent change in the real bilateral exchange rate between the foreign and local currency, so that an increase indicates an appreciation of the local (policy-imposing economy's) currency. 13 The domestic unemployment variable is defined as the level change in the domestic unemployment rate. This approach follows Irwin (2005) ; in robustness checks we have used domestic real GDP growth in lieu of unemployment and found for some countries that temporary trade barriers are more responsive to domestic unemployment changes than to real GDP growth.
The third innovation that we stress in our panel data approach is to focus on bilateral relationships between policy-imposing economies and their key trading partners. 14 This is potentially covering all four policies, we also do not include products that were subject to a simultaneous or previously imposed measure under a different policy. This phenomenon is particularly relevant as most countervailing duties are imposed simultaneously with antidumping duties on the same products. For a discussion, see Bown (2011a) .
12 important for two reasons. First, the temporary trade barriers that high income economies are employing are bilateral or discriminatory in nature. 15 Furthermore, a theoretical relationship that we wish to examine is import protection may be applied against trading partners that are experiencing negative economic shocks at home. I.e., a modeling approach that considered only the aggregated use of import protection across trading partners may not accurately capture the importance of these potential shocks. To assess this empirically, we rely on foreign real GDP growth to capture the relative strength of the trading partner's domestic macroeconomic conditions.
We estimate the negative binomial regression model of the contemporaneous (time t=0) count of imported products subject to new import protection, as a function of the value that these explanatory variables take on two quarters earlier, i.e., at time t=-2. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the quarterly data used in the empirical analysis.
Appendix I provides more information on the underlying sources of the data. the count of 6-digit Harmonized System (HS-06) imported products against which the government has newly initiated a temporary trade barrier investigation against trading partner i in quarter t.
Baseline Estimates from the Pre-Crisis Period
As is common practice for negative binomial regression models, the tables report estimates for incidence rate ratios (IRRs). An estimated IRR with a value that is statistically greater than 1 is evidence of a positive effect of the determinant of interest; i.e., the explanatory variable is associated with an increase in the number of imported products from trading partner i in quarter t subject to a new TTB investigation. Conversely, an estimated IRR that is statistically less than 1 is evidence that an increase in the explanatory variable is associated with a reduction in the count of imported products subject to new import protection. The table also reports t-statistics for whether the estimated IRR is 13 statistically different from 1. The three macroeconomic determinants of interest are the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, the change in domestic unemployment rate, and the foreign trading partner's real GDP growth. Each model includes trading-partner specific fixed effects to control for time-invariant, partner-specific heterogeneity in their treatment under these policiese.g., China's designation as a non-market economy could affect the treatment of its exporters (relative to another economy's exporters) under antidumping provisions. Finally, there are two sets of results for each of the policy-imposing economies: one that focuses on that economy's use of antidumping policy alone (the emphasis of the traditional literature), and a second that includes the broader definition of import protection inclusive of each of the relatively substitutable forms of temporary trade barriers -antidumping, countervailing duties, global safeguards, and China-specific safeguards.
Pre-crisis estimates for the United States and European Union
Consider column (1) of An estimated IRR of 1.02 indicates that a real appreciation of US dollar is associated with increased import protection through the antidumping policy; this evidence is consistent with related results from a 1980-1998 sample reported by Knetter and Prusa (2003) . The IRR of 1.75 on the change in domestic unemployment rate is greater than 1 and indicates that import protection also increases when the domestic economy is weakening through rising unemployment. The IRR of 0.92 on foreign real GDP growth is evidence that the US uses additional import protection against trading partners that are going through their own periods of weak economic growth. The time trend estimate of 0.98
indicates that US import protection through this policy has been declining over the sample period.
Finally, the IRR of 19.88 on the indicator that the trading partner is China is evidence that it was substantially more likely than the omitted trading partner (in this case, Australia) to face additional 14 import protection. 16 As has been well documented elsewhere (e.g., Bown, 2010) , this phenomenon is pervasive across policy-imposing economies, including each under examination here.
Column (2) of Table 2 reports our preferred specification for the United States. It uses the same sample of data and model as the first column; the only innovation is the dependent variable reflects not only US antidumping import protection but also its use of other temporary trade barriers such as global safeguards, China-specific safeguards, and countervailing duties. While the qualitative nature of the IRRs in the second column is similar to the first column, the magnitude of the impact of an appreciating US exchange rate changes considerably. One implication is that for the United States, a sole focus on antidumping misses an important component to the relationship between import protection and macroeconomic shocks during this period; importantly, it misses the global safeguard on steel products associated with the 2001-2 recession and period of an appreciating US dollar (see again Figure 1 ). Therefore, the subsequent analysis for the United States in the remaining sections of the paper relies on the more expansive definition of temporary trade barriers. This issue will be important to consider for a number of the other four policy-imposing economies as well.
Consider next an interpretation of the economic significance of the magnitudes of the results for the United States. Figure 2 presents a graphical interpretation of the economic effect of these macroeconomic shocks on the quantity of new import protection. We present the percent increase in the count of imported products per trading partner per quarter subject to new TTBs that are associated with a one standard deviation change in each macroeconomic determinant. Specifically, we compute the median of the model's predicted estimates of import protection evaluated using the sample data; and we then introduce (one at a time) a one standard deviation shock to each of the macroeconomic determinants of interest, holding everything else constant, and regenerate the model's predictions of import protection.
The US panel of Figure 2 interprets estimates for impacts on both the antidumping policy alone and all temporary trade barriers. In terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in the percent change of the US dollar-bilateral real exchange rate in the quarterly data for this sample period (see Table 1 ) is roughly a 16 percent (year-over-year) appreciation. This 16 percent appreciation is associated with a 37 percent increase in imported products subject to antidumping protection per trading partner per quarter. The same size shock is associated with a 99 percent increase in imported products subject to all TTB protection per trading partner per quarter.
The US estimates for shocks to the other key macroeconomic determinants are also sizeable. produces weak estimates when considering EU import protection through its antidumping policy alone. The IRR for the exchange rate appreciation is greater than 1 and the IRR for foreign GDP growth is less than 1. While these estimates are consistent with the theory, neither IRR is statistically significant. Furthermore, the IRR for the change in domestic unemployment is less than 1, though this is also not statistically significant.
However, Table 2 estimates of the EU model in column (4) are in line with the theory when we consider the more expansive measure of TTB import protection. The main contributor to the differential in the data across the two policy variables is due to EU imposition of an extensive set of import restrictions on steel products through its global safeguards policy in 2002. In this specification, an IRR of 1.05 indicates that a real appreciation of the Euro is associated with increased import protection. Figure 2 interprets a one standard deviation appreciation of the Euro as leading to 95 percent more imported products being subject to TTBs per trading partner per quarter, relative to the model's estimates at the means of the data. The IRR of 1.61 on the change in the EU's domestic unemployment rate implies that import protection also increases when unemployment is rising at home. While this IRR estimate is (marginally) not statistically different from 1, Figure 2 illustrates that a one standard deviation shock to this variable results in a 26 percent increase in import protection per trading partner per quarter. The IRR of 0.81 on foreign real GDP growth is strong evidence that the EU responds to trading partners' macroeconomic weakness through additional import protection 16 -a one standard deviation decline in a trading partner's real GDP growth is associated with the EU subjecting 101 percent more imported products from that trading partner to TTBs.
To summarize, there is strong evidence for the United States and the European Union from the period before 2008:Q3 that macroeconomic shocks are associated with substantial increases in antidumping and related forms of import protection. Furthermore, an important innovation relative to the prior literature is to consider a more comprehensive definition of import protection beyond antidumping; e.g., estimates on antidumping alone on this period's data fail to capture the true impact of these shocks on import protection. In terms of particular US and EU results, a 13-16 percent real appreciation of the bilateral exchange rate can result in nearly twice as many products being subject to these forms of import protection per trading partner per quarter. An increase in the domestic unemployment rate by roughly one half of a percentage point is associated with 26-40 percent more imported products per trading partner per quarter being subject to new TTBs.
The third point worth highlighting is that the IRR for foreign GDP growth is frequently less than 1 throughout the estimates of and their policy exceptions is to address international externalities (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002) .
Finally, while Table 2 presents a relatively compact number of specifications for each policyimposing economy due to space constraints, Appendix II provides detail on a number of additional robustness checks that we have undertaken so as to provide clarity as to the sensitivity of our US and EU results to alternative formulations of the data and model.
Pre-crisis estimates for South Korea, Australia and Canada
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the estimated trade policy response to macroeconomic shocks for the relatively "large" importing economies of the United States and European Union. The remaining columns of Table 2 apply the same methodological approach to data for three other, relatively smaller policy-imposing economies-South Korea, Australia, and Canada.
The Table 2 estimates for South Korea in columns (5) and (6) are mixed. Real appreciation of the South Korean won, as well as periods of weak foreign economic growth, are associated with Korea applying more import protection on trading partners through antidumping and related TTB policies.
However, the IRRs on the real exchange rate estimate are not statistically different from 1.
Furthermore, periods of rising unemployment in South Korea are not associated with more import protection -in fact, the IRRs for South Korea are less than 1 (and statistically significant under the more expansive import protection specification 6) and suggest that periods of a strong domestic economy were associated with episodes of greater import protection.
Columns (7) and (8) 17 While speculative, such linkages could come through political-economic shocks at the industry level that are common across the two countries (e.g., due to multinational firms, common union organization) or through the secondary impact on Canada when the United States is confronted with macroeconomic shocks, perhaps due to Canada's heavy reliance on the US market for imports and exports.
To conclude this section, the modeling approach of constructing a panel of relatively high frequency data defined bilaterally (vis-à-vis individual trading partners) produces somewhat weaker results for smaller industrialized countries such as South Korea, Australia and Canada. These economies may also be more susceptible to shocks through different emission channels than the macroeconomic determinants of new import protection found to be significant for the United States and European Union.
Import Protection during the Great Recession

Protectionist expectations
The early period of the Great Recession and the widespread fear of "protectionism" among policymakers led to the coordinated, G20 declaration of November 2008 cited above. Furthermore, share of US and EU imports subject to the existing stock of TTBs at only 2-3 percent; i.e., the predictions were that this TTB coverage of imports would increase 5-7 times above pre-crisis levels.
The reasons for the predicted run-up in new import protection illustrated in Figure 4 are clear given the results of Table 2 for the US and EU and the magnitude of the worldwide recession -i.e., new import protection was historically associated with appreciating real exchange rates, rising domestic unemployment, and economic contraction abroad. The US saw a sharp appreciation of the US dollar, and the EU experienced a brief period of an appreciating Euro. The unemployment rate rose 19 To clarify the thought experiment, the import data used to construct these shares are all taken from 2007, to remove any potential contamination associated with the 2008-9 trade collapse. Nevertheless, the products in focus would not become subject to TTB policies until 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. The mean value of annual imports in 2007 for one of the 94 product -trading partner combinations that were actually confronted with new US TTBs between 2008:Q4 and 2010:Q4 was $133.4 million. The estimate of 15.4 percent is derived by taking this $133.4 million, multiplying it by 1558 product -trading partner combinations, and dividing by $1.34 trillion -i.e., the total US non-oil imports from these 15 trading partners in 2007. The estimate is an upper limit given that product -trading partner combinations affected by US TTBs in the data ($133.4 million) are much higher than the mean product -trading partner combination in the entire sample ($30.2 million) which includes non-TTB affected products.
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significantly in both economies. Finally, the simultaneity of the recession across the world implied that virtually every US and EU trading partner was also undergoing a sharp decline in real GDP growth during this period. These three factors combined to create a potential perfect storm of conditions for a large increase in new import protection, given the way policymakers in the US and EU had historically responded, as documented in Table 2 .
Nevertheless, as the solid line of the right panel of Figure 4 illustrates, the realization of new import protection for the US and EU was much different from that which was predicted from model estimates based on historical data. While the timing of the US peak of the predicted response 
Why did so little import protection arise?
Given the severity of macroeconomic shocks that took place during the Great Recession, a fundamental research question of interest is what explains the import protection that did and did not arise? To address this question systematically, we re-estimate our preferred specifications from Table   2 on a time series of data that extends through the crisis period of 2010:Q4. We introduce pre-crisis The one variable in the first column of Table 3 for which there is an estimated behavioral change concerns the impact of foreign real GDP growth on new US TTBs. Whereas a pre-crisis IRR estimate of 0.92 on foreign real GDP growth indicates that the US had used import protection historically against trading partners that were experiencing periods of weak economic growth, the estimated IRR is 1.08 during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. While this second IRR was not statistically greater than 1, the pre-crisis and crisis IRRs are statistically different from one another, thus signaling a change in behavior. Overall, the US "switched" from its previous behavior and toward implementation of new TTB import protection against those trading partners that were experiencing economic growth and not against those that were contracting. This is a particularly important contributor to the low levels of import protection that arose given that so many of the US's key trading partners were themselves experiencing periods of severe economic contraction or weak economic growth during the Great Recession. 22 The qualitative pattern to our results does not change if we move the definition of the beginning of the crisis period by 1 or 2 quarters. 23 The estimates for the 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 period in Table 3 are not identical to Table 3 illustrates that controlling for this potential phenomenon does not affect either the qualitative nor quantitative nature of our results.
A final explanation from the first two columns of Table 3 Table 3 's results for the EU share a number of qualitative similarities with the evidence from the United States. Consider the third and fourth columns of Table 3 . The most important result is that, like the United States, there is a statistically differential estimated IRR on foreign real GDP growth across the two periods. There is thus also evidence of a behavioral change by the EU to switch away from imposing import protection on trading partners that were contracting, as had been the historical pattern, and toward those that were growing. With so many of the EU's trading partners also Table 2 of exchange rate movements, this suggests another dampening effect on import protection. Table 3 also reports mixed evidence of responsiveness of import protection to macroeconomic shocks for Australia and Canada. 26 The most robust result is across the specifications for Canada. Like the United States and the European Union, the pre-crisis IRR and crisis IRR on the foreign real GDP growth variable are statistically different from one another, indicating that Canada also switched away from imposing import protection on trading partners that were contracting and toward those that were growing. Figure 4 for the United States and European Union, the dotted lines in Figure 5 for Canada and South Korea illustrate that the model predictions based on historical data strongly overpredict the amount of products that would subsequently become subject to new import protection during the Great Recession. The model from Table 2 overpredicts Canada's new import protection by a factor of 10 and overpredicts South Korea's by a factor of 50, relative to the new import protection that was realized in the data.
Conclusion
This paper uses quarterly data for the United States, European Union, and three other industrialized economies to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on import protection over 1988:Q1- 26 We do not report Table 4 estimates for South Korea because it imposed so few new import restrictions during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 that there was insufficient variation in the dependent variable for identification.
2010:Q4. Estimates for the US and EU from before the Great Recession exhibit evidence of three key relationships. First, a 13-16 percent real appreciation of the bilateral exchange rate can result in nearly twice as many imported products per trading partner per quarter being subject to temporary trade barriers. Second, an increase in the domestic unemployment rate by roughly one half of a percentage point is associated with 26-40 percent more imported products per trading partner per quarter being subject to new import protection. Third, we find a previously overlooked result that the US and EU historically imposed bilateral import restrictions on trading partners that were going through periods of weak economic growth; suggestive evidence consistent with the Bagwell and
Staiger (2002) Turkey. These economies were the source of 85 percent of non-oil imports during this period.
 European Union (15): Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Specifications (1) and (5) replace the variable capturing the domestic macroeconomic shockthe change in the domestic unemployment rate -with growth in domestic real GDP. The theoretical prediction is for an IRR that is less than 1; i.e., domestic macroeconomic contraction is associated with a higher incidence of TTBs. For the EU, the IRR is 0.44 and statistically significant. However, for the US the IRR of 1.03, though it is not statistically different from 1. Nevertheless the IRR estimates for the other determinants of interest (i.e., compared to the baseline models in Table 2 ) are qualitatively unaffected by use of this alternative indicator of the health of the domestic macroeconomy.
In specifications (2) and (6) we add a new variable to the baseline specification defined as the stock of imported products against trading partner i already subject to temporary trade barriers in t-1.
Since the stock of imported product categories is fixed over time, the rationale for including this variable is to control for the concern higher coverage of those products by existing import protection would expectedly lead to less need for new import protection. The IRR for the EU (0.97) is statistically less than 1 and is thus consistent with this theory, while the IRR for the US (1.00) is not statistically different from 1. More importantly, inclusion of this variable also does not affect the qualitative pattern of results for the main determinants of interest.
The change in specifications (3) and (7) is to simply replace the values of the macroeconomic determinants used in the baseline specification (defined in year t-2) with their values in t-1. The results are unaffected.
Finally, in specifications (4) and (8) we redefine the policy variable to only reflect imported products that were ultimately hit with imposed trade restrictions. Recall the baseline definition was the count of products subject to an investigation (under antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguard provisions) against trading partner i in quarter t, regardless of how the investigation terminated. Early research from Staiger and Wolak (1994) has shown how even an investigation can have trade-destroying effects. As a final robustness check we reconstruct the dependent variable so that it is defined as the count of products subject to an investigation (under antidumping, 31 countervailing duty, or safeguard provisions) from trading partner i in quarter t that ultimately were subject to a new import-restriction. However, because the final policy decisions by government authorities take place many months after the initiation of the investigation (quarter t) and may be influenced by "updated" macroeconomic conditions, we shift forward the timing of the exchange rate and domestic unemployment rate variables. For the United States we shift these variables ahead two quarters, whereas for the European Union (was has a lengthier government investigation procedure)
we shift these variables ahead three quarters. Under these specifications of the model reported in columns (4) and (8), the qualitative nature of the empirical results are consistent with those reported in Table 2 . (at t-2) . Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs) are reported in lieu of coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. In square brackets are t-statistics that the estimated IRRs across the two sub-periods are different. Model includes a constant term whose estimate is suppressed. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. ‡EU data for 1999:Q1-2010:Q4 only.
US TTBs initiated in t-
†CAN regressions also include US TTBs initiated in t-1 as a regressor. 
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